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La guerra del Vietnam: Injusticia y Ultraje
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Resumen
Muchas de las acciones del ejército de los Estados Unidos durante la guerra de Indo-
china, en las que se utilizó la capacidad de disparo en una escala sin precedentes, eran 
potenciales generadores de indignación en Indochina, en los Estados Unidos y en otros 
lugares. El examen de tres aspectos interconectados de las operaciones militares de los 
Estados Unidos en la guerra de Indochina (los bombardeos, el Programa Phoenix y la 
masacre de My Lai) proporciona numerosos ejemplos de cómo trató el gobierno esta-
dounidense de impedir que sus acciones generaran indignación. Los métodos usados 
se pueden clasifi car en cinco categorías: ocultamiento de la acción; minusvaloración 
del objetivo; reinterpretación de la acción; uso de canales ofi ciales para hacer parecer 
justa la acción; fi nalmente, intimidación y soborno de personas implicadas. El presente 
análisis muestra que la reducción de la indignación ciudadana es una tarea fundamental 
para quienes hacen la guerra; además, señala diversos modos de enfrentarse a quienes 
fomentan la injusticia.
Palabras clave: injusticia, ultraje, Indochina.
Abstract
In the war in Indochina, with its unprecedented scale of fi repower, many U.S. military 
actions had the potential to generate outrage in Indochina, the United States, and 
elsewhere. Examination of three interrelated aspects of U.S. military operations in 
the Indochina war — the bombing, the Phoenix Program, and the My Lai massacre 
— reveals numerous examples of how the U.S. government tried to inhibit outrage 
from its actions. Th e methods used can be classifi ed into fi ve categories: covering up 
the action; devaluing the target; reinterpreting the action; using offi  cial channels to give 
the appearance of justice; and intimidating and bribing people involved. Th is analysis 
shows how minimization of public outrage is a key task for war-makers and also points 
to a variety of ways to challenge the perpetrators of injustice.
Keywords: backfi re, injustice, outrage, Indochina.
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Wars would be unsustainable if enough soldiers and civilians were so shocked and 
disgusted by killing, maiming, deprivation and destruction that they withdrew their 
support. Th erefore, a key part of war-making is the process of managing outrage, either 
containing it or directing it towards the enemy. Techniques for containing outrage are 
especially important when obvious injustices occur, such as blatant aggression, use of 
banned weapons, massacres of civilians, and massive killing. Social historian Barrington 
Moore, Jr. observed that a sense of injustice can be found in virtually every culture, and 
that certain actions by rulers regularly arouse this sense of injustice (Moore, 1978).
Our aim in this paper is to explore the techniques used by the U.S. military and 
government to contain outrage in the war in Indochina (known by the Vietnamese as 
the American war). Th ere are several reasons why the Indochina war is ideal for this 
sort of analysis. Firstly, many diff erent actions by the U.S. military in Indochina could 
and often did cause shock and anger. Secondly, there is a great deal of documentary 
evidence about the war. Finally, the signifi cance of the Indochina war continues to be 
an issue in policy and public debate today. Analyzing the war from a new perspective 
can contribute to both historical understanding and public debate.
We examine the war in Indochina using a framework for analyzing the dynamics of 
backfi re from injustices. In brief, actions seen as unjust may cause outrage among tar-
gets and observers and consequently backfi re against the perpetrator. We use the term 
outrage as a surrogate for a range of adverse reactions such as concern, shock, disgust 
and revulsion. Five methods are commonly used by perpetrators to inhibit outrage; these 
methods thus have the potential to prevent or moderate backfi re. Th ey are: covering 
up the action; devaluing the target; reinterpreting the action; using offi  cial channels to 
give the appearance of justice; and intimidating and bribing people involved. In turn, 
action can be taken to counter each of these fi ve methods of inhibition.
In the following section, we outline the backfi re framework. Next we give an overview 
of the three interrelated aspects of the war in Indochina we will analyze: the bombing; 
the Phoenix Program; and the My Lai massacre. Th en, in fi ve sections, we look in 
turn at each of the fi ve methods for inhibiting outrage from injustice, giving examples 
of how these methods were used by the U.S. government and military forces in the 
Indochina war. In the fi nal section we discuss ways to counter the fi ve methods of 
inhibiting outrage.
Most studies of warfare, when they examine techniques, focus on military eff ectiveness, 
perhaps noting their political side eff ects. Th e backfi re model off ers a diff erent perspec-
tive on warfare, giving central stage to political dynamics, specifi cally the creation or 
minimization of public outrage. In our attempt to present a diff erent way of looking at 
warfare, we rely on secondary sources. Th ere is a surfeit of information about the war. 
Th e challenge is to make sense of it in a way that off ers insights for future campaigns 
against injustice.
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2. The Dynamics of Backfire
It is commonly believed that superior force — in particular, violence — will always be 
victorious over opponents with inferior force. Contrary to this belief, though, there are 
many examples in which the exercise of violence against peaceful opponents has been 
seriously counterproductive. Gandhi developed the strategy of satyagraha or nonviolent 
action, and showed in practice how this could undermine the strength of attackers. For 
example, in the 1930 salt satyagraha, the beating of nonresisting protesters led to a tre-
mendous increase in support for Indian independence within India, Britain, and other 
countries (Weber, 1997). Other examples include the 1905 “bloody Sunday” killings 
in Russia that undermined support for the Czar and the 1960 Sharpeville massacre in 
South Africa that increased international opposition to apartheid. Th ere are many such 
examples (Sharp, 1973). 
Th e same process can be observed in cases outside the framework of violence used 
against peaceful protesters. For example, the beating of Rodney King by Los Angeles 
police in 1991 led to an enormous public reaction against the police after a video of the 
beating was broadcast (Martin, 2005). In 2004, publication of vivid photos of humi-
liation and torture of prisoners by U.S. guards in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq caused 
outrage internationally.
Th ere are two key requirements for such actions to arouse increased opposition. Firs-
tly, actions must be perceived as unjust, disproportionate, or otherwise inappropriate. 
Secondly, information about the actions must be communicated to receptive audiences. 
Without the video, the beating of Rodney King would have passed virtually unnoti-
ced.
Examination of a range of cases reveals that techniques commonly used by perpetrators 
to inhibit outrage can be conveniently grouped into fi ve categories (Martin, 2007):
• Cover-up of the action;
• Devaluation of the target;
• Reinterpretation of the action;
• Use of offi  cial channels to give the appearance of justice;
• Intimidation and bribery.
Consider for example the 1991 Dili massacre, in which Indonesian troops opened fi re 
on a funeral procession just as it was entering Santa Cruz cemetery (Kohen, 1999). 
Th ere had been many previous massacres in East Timor during the Indonesian occu-
pation, but they had not caused serious repercussions because of Indonesian censors-
hip. But in 1991, several western journalists were present, including fi lmmaker Max 
Stahl who captured the killings on videotape. Indonesian censorship failed to prevent 
the videotape getting out of the country; once shown internationally, it led to a huge 
increase in international support for East Timor’s independence. Th e attempted cover-
up failed.
Indonesian offi  cials denigrated the East Timorese; one, for example, called them “agi-
tators” and “scum”. But attempts at devaluation had little salience for internatio nal 
audiences.
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Indonesian authorities reinterpreted the events in several ways. Initially they reported 
19 deaths, a fi gure later raised to 50. (An independent investigation came up with a 
fi gure of 271.) Indonesian authorities also blamed the events on the protesters. 
Because of the international outcry, the Indonesian government set up an inquiry, 
which gave token sentences to several offi  cials. Similarly, the Indonesian military set 
up an inquiry, with similar results. But these eff orts to use offi cial channels to give an 
appearance of justice had little credibility internationally.
Immediately after the massacre, Indonesian troops arrested, beat, and killed many East 
Timorese independence activists. Th is would have intimidated many within East Timor, 
but only caused more outrage internationally.
In summary, the Dili massacre was an atrocity, and information about it was communi-
cated widely. Th e Indonesian government used all fi ve methods to inhibit outrage but, 
unlike previous massacres, was unable to cover up the killings or signifi cantly dampen 
the adverse reaction (Martin, 2007: 23-33).
Just as perpetrators can act to inhibit outrage, so opponents can act to express it, by 
countering each of the fi ve methods of inhibition: exposing the action; validating the 
target; interpreting the action as unjust; avoiding or discrediting offi  cial channels; and 
resisting and exposing intimidation and bribery. 
Th e backfi re model has been applied to a wide range of issues, including censorship 
(Jansen and Martin, 2003), defamation (Gray and Martin, 2006), electroshock weapons 
(Martin and Wright, 2003), refugees (Herd, 2006), industrial disasters (Engel and 
Martin, 2006) and sexual harassment (Scott and Martin, 2006). Tactics used by perpe-
trators in these and other areas (Martin, 2007) fi t into the same fi ve categories, which 
are fairly general and need to be interpreted according to the case study. For example, 
the method of devaluation includes any means of reducing the status or reputation of 
the target, ranging from scurrilous gossip in academic dismissals to dehumanisation 
in genocide. 
Th is approach can readily be applied to war, such as the struggle between those suppor-
ting and opposing the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Martin, 2004). In this paper, we focus 
both on the rationale for the war in Vietnam and more extensively on the acts carried 
out in the war itself. 
In warfare, unlike events such as the salt satyagrapha beatings or the Dili massacre, both 
sides use violence. For many observers, this undermines the sense of injustice: if the 
other side uses violence, it is widely considered acceptable to use violence in response. 
Th is is true even when there is a great disproportion between the violence used by the 
two sides. Nevertheless, even in warfare some actions are widely considered outrageous 
and have the potential to backfi re. Hence we can expect war-makers will, if necessary, 
use all fi ve methods to inhibit outrage. 
Blowback, which can be roughly defi ned as the adverse and often unforeseen conse-
quences of government policies, especially covert operations (Johnson, 2000; Simpson, 
1988), is one type of backfi re. Backfi re is a broader concept than
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blowback: backfi res can occur as a result of wide range of actions, from censorship to 
genocide, and as a result of action by a variety of perpetrators, not just governments. 
Backfi re analysis, including the study of methods of inhibiting and expressing outrage, 
gives insights into tactics mostly absent from the concept of blowback. For example, 
the tactics used by the Los Angeles police in relation to the beating Rodney King can 
be analyzed using backfi re categories (Martin, 2005), whereas the outcome would not 
normally be described as blowback, because the beating was not part of government 
policy and certainly was not covert.
3. The Indochina War
Th e war in Indochina (Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, 1970; Gavel, 1971; 
Karnow, 1983; Porter, 1979), commonly referred to as the Vietnam war, can be seen as a 
nationalist and anticolonialist war, as a revolutionary war, and as a hot point of the cold 
war. As our focus is on tactics used by U.S. leaders for the containment of outrage, we 
do not dwell on the driving forces behind the war except to note that anticommunism 
was a major factor behind U.S. government policy in Indochina. 
Indochina was mainly rural; rural support for revolution was the key to the way the 
war was fought on all sides. Th e relationship between guerilla fi ghters and the people 
in a rural revolution has been characterized as being like fi sh in the ocean (Committee 
of Concerned Asian Scholars, 1970: 80). In response, U.S. planners devised their own 
theory and policies to counter such a revolution. Basically, this involved the use of 
massive force to either destroy the people or to force them to move into the areas under 
the control of the U.S.-supported side. Th is U.S. policy of destroying and displacing 
the civilian base of the enemy, by “drying up the ocean,” was one aspect of the overall 
counterinsurgency policy known as the Pacifi cation Program. 
Bombing
In Vietnam the majority of U.S. bombing was in the South of the country in the rural 
areas. (In the North the bombing was largely targeted on urban areas and the popu-
lation had to decentralize: Miguel and Roland, 2005). Much of the U.S. bombing of 
Indochina was integrated into the Pacifi cation Program, primarily as part of what were 
called “search and destroy missions.” Th ese missions have been graphically described as 
“typically [beginning] with B-52 saturation bombing of an ‘objective’ area … [followed 
by] long range artillery fi re … aerial bombing by smaller, lower fl ying attack bombers 
which are armed with half-ton bombs, … and huge canisters of gelatinous napalm … 
Last to arrive and devastate the ‘objective’ from the air are helicopter gunships fi ring 
rockets and M-60 machine guns …” (Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, 1970: 
104; see also Schell, 1967). After these bombing attacks, any people left alive were 
either forced to move to the cities or were herded into “strategic hamlets,” set up and 
fi nanced by the United States, surrounded by high barbed wire fences to separate the 
“ocean” from the “fi sh.” Between 1965 and 1970, 5,000 hamlets, with an estimated 
population of four million people, were destroyed. 
Th e use of chemicals (such as CS gas and napalm) and herbicides (such as Agents 
Orange and Blue) against the people, forests, and crops was also part of this overall 
Pacifi cation Program of destroying the capacity for people to support the guerilla
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fi ghters, rather than primarily, as the Army generally claimed, to destroy the opposing 
military forces or to destroy their forest cover. According to the Committee of Con-
cerned Asian Scholars (1970: 112), “Th e army denies that herbicides were used in 
populated areas. But there is ample documentary evidence to the contrary, even from 
government sources.”
Th is was the policy throughout Indochina. In Laos, from 1965 to 1973, the U.S. Air 
Force dropped over 2,000,000 tons of bombs. Most of the victims were civilians. In 
Cambodia in March 1969, the U.S. military increased to “intensive” the secret bom-
bing program: 3,630 B-52 bombing raids annihilated the country (Kiernan, 1989; 
Shawcross, 1987: 28).
Th e U.S. bombing in Indochina was the “heaviest aerial bombardment in history” 
(Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, 1970: 97). 
The Phoenix Program
If bombing was the “blanket” method of eliminating support for the guerillas, then the 
Phoenix Program was the more “targeted” method (Valentine, 1990). Set up, funded, 
and organized by the CIA in South Vietnam in 1967, the program was, according to 
offi  cial documents examined, “aimed at ‘neutralizing’ — through assassination, kid-
napping, and systematic torture — the civilian infrastructure that supported the Viet 
Cong” (Valentine, 2006; see also Browne, 1965: 260-63). Carried out by both U.S. 
and its allied Vietnamese forces, the Phoenix Program worked on blacklists, compiled 
through intelligence, of the people in the villages considered to be working in any 
capacity lending support to the National Liberation Front, referred to by U.S. offi  cials 
as the Viet Cong or VC. Th ese people were then hunted by special units and “neutra-
lized.” Many thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, were killed through the program 
(Vietnam’s Policy and Prospects, 1970). According to the U.S. mission in Saigon, in the 
year of 1969 alone some 19,500 civilian “infrastructure” had been “neutralized” with 
6,000 killed (Karnow, 1983: 602). Th e program was riddled with corruption and chaos 
(Davidson, 1988: 480; Karnow, 1983: 602). As one commentator on U.S. intelligence 
observed, “it was easier to fabricate progress than to achieve it.” Nevertheless, so many 
of the civilian “infrastructure” were jailed, tortured, and killed that Pham Van Dong, 
the Premier of Hanoi, said at the war’s end the political structure in the South had been 
all but destroyed (Snepp, 1984: 57).
The My Lai Massacre
Th e My Lai massacre is essentially a local example of what resulted generally from the 
Pacifi cation Program, which targeted whole regions, and the Phoenix Program within 
this, which targeted specifi cally identifi ed people and villages. My Lai was a hamlet 
known as “Pinkville,” as it was in a pink-colored area on the military map. All who lived 
there were considered, by the U.S. forces, to be sympathizers of communists or the VC, 
and therefore open targets. On 16 March 1968, U.S. troops attacked My Lai. Th ere was 
no resistance; only women, children, and old men were there. Over a period of hours, 
the soldiers shot the inhabitants, after fi rst raping some of the females, burned all the 
homes, and destroyed possessions, crops, and wells (Belknap, 2002; Bilton and Sim, 
1992; Hersh, 1972). (On My Lai and backfi re, see also Gray and Martin, 2008.)
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Th e bombing, the Phoenix Program, and the My Lai massacre are examples of actions 
during the Indochina war that policy makers well knew had the potential to generate 
outrage. In order to continue with the war, the U.S. government needed to prevent or 
contain such adverse reactions, which could lay the foundation for eff ective opposition 
to U.S. policies. In the following fi ve sections, we examine the fi ve standard methods for 
inhibiting outrage from injustice: cover-up; devaluation of the target; reinterpretation 
of the action; use of offi  cial channels to give the appearance of justice; and intimidation 
and bribery. We discuss each method separately, noting as we proceed the links and 
overlaps between the diff erent methods.
4. Cover-up
Because people cannot react against something unless they know about it, secrecy is 
a powerful technique for preventing adverse reactions. Th ere are various audiences to 
consider, including members of the public in the United States, foreign governments, 
and foreign populations. Even within the U.S. government and military, cover-up can 
be important to reduce dissent and to prevent leakage to wider audiences. Cover-up 
can even be important in relation to the targets of attack: villagers might know they 
are being bombed but not know about what is happening elsewhere in the country. In 
atrocities such as My Lai, every surviving witness increases the risk of exposure.
In practice, cover-up was carried out in a variety of ways, including (to name a few): 
systematic secrecy at all levels of the State Department and the Defense Department; 
the culture in the army of “denying everything”; the destruction of documents; the use 
of internal consulting within the Defense Department to withhold important infor-
mation from the public and Congress; the use of “non military” forces to carry out 
military actions (relabeling); and restrictions placed on reporting both offi  cially and 
through the media. 
Th e cover-up was both in prospect as well as retrospect. For example, in late 1963, prior 
to the Tonkin Gulf incident, offi  cial planning for a secret war against North Vietnam 
included, on President Johnson’s direction, estimates of “the plausibility of denial” of 
such actions (Gettleman et al., 1995: 242).
Th e Pentagon Papers, a retrospective collection of offi  cial materials about policy and 
planning of the war, are perhaps the most well known documents about the Indochina 
war. Th e U.S. government attempted to keep these papers secret from the public (Ell-
sberg, 2002). Th e U.S. government tried to cover up overall activities in Indochina as 
well as specifi c actions on the ground.
For example, the Geneva Accords of 1962 declared Laos a neutral country and the U.S. 
government agreed offi  cially to remove all military personnel. In reality it used the civi-
lian Agency for International Development (AID) as a cover for continued involvement 
by the U.S. military and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Ellsberg, 2002: 445). Use 
of mercenaries, “advisers,” “special forces,” green berets on contract to CIA/AID, and 
U.S. Air Force bombers taking off  from Th ailand and South Vietnam, enabled U.S. 
offi  cials to deny any military involvement. 
All this was hidden from the U.S. public and Congress; it was kept as a “diplomatic 
secret” that the U.S. government was breaking the Geneva Accords in what were acts 
of war (Ellsberg, 2002: 446). Finally, in 1969, when the public learned enough about 
these secret actions through New York Times reports and demanded
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change, there was a Congressional Hearing, though this was also behind closed doors. 
At this hearing, some government offi  cials refused to testify and President Nixon, under 
pressure, only allowed the release of a heavily censored version of the evidence. Senator 
William Fulbright observed that, “What strikes me most is that an operation of this 
size could be carried out without members of the Senate knowing it — and without 
the public knowing!” (Burchett, 1970: 99).
Th e comprehensive nature of cover-up processes is evident in reports of U.S. military 
actions on the ground in Laos. Names were changed: U.S. forces in Laos were labeled 
“Special Forces” and called “Study and Observation Groups” under the aegis of AID. 
Places were changed: casualties occurring in Laos were recorded as being inside Viet-
nam. Disguises were worn: “reconnaissance teams didn’t go out with U.S. weapons, 
carrying instead ‘sterile’ ones, communist-made Ak-47 automatic rifl es or Swedish K 
submachineguns … Th ey even wore modifi ed jungle boots, the cleated soles having 
been replaced with tire rubber so the prints resembled those of the enemy’s Ho Chi 
Minh sandals” (Nolan, 1986: xiii-xiv).
Even the word “secret” was avoided. William Sullivan, former U.S. ambassador to Laos, 
said in an interview that the herbicide program was not appropriately described as secret, 
but instead as “not admitted or confi rmed” (Severo, 1982, cited in Wells-Dang, 2002). 
In a memo to the State Department, Sullivan wrote that, “We can carry on these eff orts 
only if we do not, repeat do not, talk about them, and when necessary, if we deny that 
they are taking place” (Telegram from the U.S. Embassy, Vientiane to the Department 
of State, 30 November 1965, cited in Wells-Dang, 2002). 
U.S. military actions in Cambodia followed similar patterns of secrecy. To prevent any 
knowledge of the saturation bombing programs of 1969 from leaking to the public or 
to Congress, normal reporting systems for top-secret bombing operations were “not 
enough.” General Wheeler cabled General Abrams setting out the ways in which the 
bombing was to be concealed from the public. “In the event press inquiries are received 
… as to whether or not U.S. B-52s have struck in Cambodia, U.S. spokesmen will 
confi rm that B-52s did strike on routine missions adjacent to the Cambodian border but 
state that he has no details and will look into this question” (Shawcross, 1987: 22). 
“[F]ew senior offi  cials were told” about the bombing and no Congressional committees 
were notifi ed (Shawcross, 1987: 29). Although it was the public duty of Congressional 
Committees to authorize spending for any armed actions, in this case the President was 
making war on another country without going through the appropriate channels of 
public oversight. For the military, a system of dual reporting was organized to cover the 
tracks of bombing runs against Cambodia by giving a second set of (false) grid references 
for the target areas where the bombs were dropped (Shawcross, 1987: 30).
Th e role of the U.S. government in the organization and funding of the Phoenix Pro-
gram was continually denied. Th e name Phoenix itself obscured the actual purpose of 
the program. Th e assassination activities of its “operatives” were carried out by “counter 
terror teams” or improbably named Provincial Reconnaissance Units. When Congress 
tried to investigate the program, the Defense Department denied the
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Committee access to records necessary to carry out an audit of funds used for the pro-
gram (McGehee, 1996). 
Th e events of My Lai illustrate how layered the processes of cover-up can be. Th e mas-
sacre was initially unreported by the military. When the details of what had happened 
were eventually undeniable, it was presented to the public as an “isolated incident,” as 
an “unfortunate” once-only event. Th at it was a typical outcome of the general strategy 
of pacifi cation, and that there was evidence that the people in the villages attacked 
were listed on the Phoenix Program’s black lists of Viet Cong infrastructure marked for 
“neutralization” or “elimination” was denied (McGehee, 1996).
Th e actions of the U.S. army taskforce at My Lai and other villages on the day were 
fed into the army reporting mechanisms that listed body counts as a measure of the 
success of the “sortie.” My Lai was diff used as another set of statistics until an ex-GI 
named Riddenhour wrote letters reporting what he knew to the Pentagon, to members 
of Congress, and to other government offi  cials (Hersh, 1972: 4). As described later in 
the section on offi  cial channels, censorship of the My Lai events continued during and 
following offi  cial inquiries.
5. Devaluation
Devaluing people makes it easier to attack them without arousing concern. In wars 
throughout history, the enemy has commonly been portrayed in extremely negati-
ve ways, for example as a faceless being, criminal, torturer, or agent of death (Keen, 
1986). 
In a survey of U.S. television coverage from 1965 to 1973, Daniel Hallin found the NLF 
and North Vietnamese were characteristically portrayed as “cruel, ruthless, and fanatical” 
(Hallin 1986: 148). Th eir actions, including military operations, were called terrorism. 
Th ey were referred to as “‘fanatical,’ ‘suicidal,’ ‘savage,’ ‘halfcrazed’.” Metaphors of disea-
se were used: “Television reports routinely referred to areas controlled by the NLF as 
‘Communist infested,’ or ‘Vietcong infested’” (Hallin, 1986: 158). Th e investigations 
into the My Lai massacre highlighted the way U.S. forces referred to Vietnamese as, 
among other such terms, “gooks,” “chinks,” “Orientals,” and “dinks.” 
Th e use of the body count as a measure of success or progress in winning the war had 
the eff ect of reducing people to numbers, with no humanity. Th e actual process of 
killing was blanked out as “elimination,” “neutralization,” or “strikes” on “objectives.” 
Civilians became Viet Cong infrastructure or VCI; terror squads became Provincial 
Reconnaissance Units or PRUs.
Th e ultimate in dehumanization is evident in the bombing raids. In modern techno-
logical war, another form of devaluation is to treat the enemy as an abstraction, for 
example as a set of coordinates for bombing (Keen, 1986). Th e targeting was of “areas” 
or map coordinates visible only as blips on screens. Th e remoteness and distance had 
the eff ect of detaching actions from their consequences, and served to reduce poten-
tial revulsion felt either by perpetrators (Grossman, 1995) or by those to whom these 
actions were reported.
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Consider an action, such as torture, that is widely perceived as wrong. Cover-up means 
hiding the torture: if outsiders don’t know about it, they can’t be outraged. But if cover-
up fails and the torture is exposed, it is still possible to dampen concern. One way, as 
discussed, is to devalue the victim. Another way is reinterpretation, which includes a 
variety of techniques to change the meaning of the action. For example, it could be 
said the action was not really torture, that the action didn’t cause much damage to the 
victim, or that someone else was to blame.
Often reinterpretation overlaps with cover-up, as when deaths are admitted but details 
about the number killed or the manner of death are omitted. Reinterpretations can be 
genuinely held beliefs or calculated disinformation. Two important forms of reinter-
pretation are to change the meaning attached to an event and to change the allocation 
of responsibility for the event.
Reinterpretation operated in relation to the actions on the ground and in relation to the 
overall justifi cation of U.S. military involvement in Indochina. We begin with actions 
on the ground, using the categories of relabeling, choice of language, misleading infor-
mation, and decontexualizing.
Relabeling
South Vietnamese peasants were referred to pejoratively as the Viet Cong and were 
said to have infi ltrated into their own land (South Vietnam), as if they were outside 
military forces. 
In Laos, the U.S. government referred to Pathet Lao troops as North Vietnamese tro-
ops (Burchett, 1970: 176). U.S. forces were called “special forces,” by which the use 
of air force helicopter units, bombers, mercenaries, and green berets on contract could 
be used without acknowledging them as “military” involvement. To this eff ect, on 6 
March 1970 President Nixon stated that, “Th ere are no American ground combat 
troops in Laos — We have no plans for introducing ground combat forces into Laos” 
(Gettleman et al., 1995: 449). Yet U.S. special forces had been operating in Laos since 
1964, were then operating in Laos, and continued to do so: according to subsequently 
released Congressional hearings, tens of thousands of U.S. personnel were involved in 
Laos (Gettleman et al., 1995: 449n14).
Choice of Language
Th e bombing raids over South Vietnam were claimed to be “tactical” against military 
targets or the VC forces, mainly on the Ho Chi Minh trail, and not on populated areas. 
In reality, they were aimed “strategically” at the rural population. 
Th e Phoenix Program, itself a euphemism, was said to target the VC infrastructure as 
a military objective when the VC infrastructure was actually composed of civilians. As 
CIA operative Nelson Brickham reported, “When we speak of the VC infrastructure, we 
are speaking of the VC organizational hierarchy, the management structure, as opposed 
to guerrillas, for example VC troops” (Brickham, 1996). 
Language used by supporters of U.S. policies in Indochina presented an interpretation 
of those policies as benevolent (“they terrorize,” “we pacify”), whereas others saw this 
as masking atrocities. According to a study of 28 U.S. high school 
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textbooks, the word terror was never used in referring to U.S. military actions (Griff en 
and Marciano, 1979: 49). 
Misleading Information
Th e massacre at My Lai was initially reported as a conventional military fi refi ght. 
Understatement of the numbers killed and announcement of a battle victory was the 
standard offi  cial and press position. Internal investigations gave erroneous reports. It 
was revealed later, in testimony to the Peers investigation into the cover-up of the 
massacre, that even body counts were made up in the army hierarchy. As one of the 
soldiers (Congleton) being questioned stated, “Captain Michles ‘told me to make it 
look good’” (Hersh, 1972: 20).
A key defender of the Phoenix program, U.S. government offi  cial William Colby, tes-
tifi ed to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1970. Douglas Valentine reports 
that, 
Colby defi ned Phoenix as an internal security program designed to protect “the people” 
from “Communist terrorism.” And by defi ning “the people” apart from the VCI, as the 
object of VCI terror and as voluntarily participating in the program, he established a 
moral imperative for Phoenix (Valentine, 1990: 316).
Decontextualizing
My Lai is a prime example of an “isolated event” interpretation, which removes the 
wider context. Many higher-ranking offi  cers and offi  cials reported to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee that “what apparently occurred at My Lai is wholly unrepresentative 
of the manner in which our forces conduct military operations in Vietnam.” President 
Nixon reiterated this interpretation at a press conference, saying he believed it was “an 
isolated incident” (Belknap, 2002: 135). But as the testimony to the Peers investigation 
showed, the soldiers at My Lai were just doing what everyone else was doing.
We now turn to overall justifi cations of U.S. military involvement in Indochina, listing 
here a variety of the ones more commonly used.
The Domino Theory
In a 1954 press conference, President Dwight D. Eisenhower said, in reference to the 
U.S. support of the French in Indochina, “You have a row of dominos set up, you knock 
over the fi rst one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go 
over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have 
the most profound infl uences” (quoted in Gustainis, 1993: 3). Th e domino theory, as it 
became known, made every individual nation a separate “key” to the region. In this vein, 
then Senator John F. Kennedy stated in June 1956: “Vietnam represents the cornerstone 
of the Free World in Southeast Asia, the Keystone to the arch, the fi nger in the dike. 
Burma, Th ailand, India, Japan, the Philippines and, obviously, Laos and Cambodia 
are among those whose security would be threatened if the red tide of Communism 
overfl owed into Vietnam” (Chomsky, 1993: 45). Th is mechanistic theory generalized 
the signifi cance of any one country across an entire region. 
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In line with the domino theory, it was put that the U.S. military was fi ghting a war to 
“defend” Vietnam against aggressors from the North. Th ese aggressors were variously 
argued to be the Russians, the Chinese, and later the Vietnamese themselves, referred 
to as the “North Vietnamese” as if they came from a country separate from the South. 
Although U.S. policy makers recognized among themselves that the independence 
movement in Vietnam was essentially nationalist, the public face of U.S. policy was 
defending South Vietnam, as Hanson Baldwin of the New York Times reported, “against 
proxy armies of Soviet Russia” (quoted in Chomsky, 1993: 2).
Civil War/Internal Aggression
Another presentation of the war in Vietnam was as a civil war. According to Adlai 
Stevenson, the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam during the Kennedy and Johnson admi-
nistrations, the war was against “internal aggression” (Chomsky, 1993: 41). However, 
as Daniel Ellsberg observed, “To call a confl ict in which one army is fi nanced and 
equipped entirely by foreigners a ‘civil war’ simply screens a more painful reality: that 
the war is, after all, a foreign aggression.” with the foreigners being U.S. forces (Ellsberg, 
1972: 33). 
Democracy versus Communism
President Eisenhower admitted that everyone he knew thought Ho Chi Minh would 
have been elected by a vote of some 80 percent of the Vietnamese people (Committee 
of Concerned Asian Scholars, 1970: 146). Th e U.S. government intervened to prevent 
general elections in Vietnam scheduled for 1956, yet subsequently couched the war as 
one of democracy versus communism. Th e U.S.-supported side, it was claimed, repre-
sented democracy in the fi ght against communism. Th at the people of Vietnam were 
likely to vote for communism did not appear to interfere with this position.
Inadvertence/Bumbling
Overall U.S. policies were not acknowledged as being thought out and intentional, ins-
tead being referred to as having been arrived at in an inadvertent, bumbling manner. For 
example, Samuel Huntington wrote that “In an absent minded way the United States 
in Viet Nam may well have stumbled upon the answer to ‘wars of national liberation’,” 
namely the process of “forced-draft urbanization and modernization” (Huntington, 
1968: 652).
Lack of Information/Expert Opinion
When the war collapsed as a result of sustained Vietnamese resistance, increasing public 
opposition in the United States, and resistance among U.S. troops, those most responsi-
ble for designing the war brought forward self-serving interpretations of their actions.
Robert McNamara, a key architect of the war who later became head of the World 
Bank, is now well known for claiming the United States was “adrift” in Vietnam with 
little expert opinion about the historical, political, or social profi le of the country. Yet 
McNamara is also famous for having ordered the collection of the documentation of 
the war in what became known as the Pentagon Papers. Th is 
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documentation alone dispels such claims. In his autobiography, McNamara (1996) 
says the government didn’t have experts to consult, but as the Pentagon Papers and the 
documents released later under FOI demonstrate, there was no shortage of reliable and 
detailed expert analyses available within the State Department, the Defense Depart-
ment, and the CIA (Sarris, 1995).
Quagmire/Tragedy/Mistake/Best of Intentions
Th e position that the U.S. administration — and the country — was “sucked” deeper 
and deeper into the war unwillingly, as if into a quagmire, has been regularly advanced 
(Ellsberg, 1972: 42; Halberstam, 1987). U.S. actions in Indochina have commonly 
been referred to as a “tragedy” or a “mistake,” presenting the war as unintentional. Th e 
“best of intentions” just went wrong. But as has been pointed out, the publication of 
the Pentagon Papers in 1971 demonstrated “how consciously and willingly most of the 
decisions to escalate had been made” (Shawcross, 1987: 129n).
7. Official Channels
By “offi  cial channels” we refer to any process promising to deal with issues authoritati-
vely and fairly, such as grievance procedures, formal inquiries, assessments by experts, 
and court trials. Th e use of offi  cial channels off ers the expectation that justice will be 
done and thus serves to reduce public anger from injustice. Sometimes offi  cial channels 
do indeed provide justice but in many cases they give only the appearance of justice. 
Furthermore, even when the outcomes reached are fair, almost all offi  cial channels are 
slow, procedural, and dependent on experts (such as lawyers), all of which can muffl  e 
and delay an urgent cry for justice. Some offi  cial channels operate in partial secrecy, 
further reducing the potential for outrage.
Th roughout the period of the war in Indochina there were many calls in the United 
States for governmental inquiries. Even the few Congressional Hearings that eventuated 
were frequently blocked by the administration’s lack of cooperation. 
Th roughout its long years of fi nancial and military involvement in Vietnam, the U.S. 
government never declared war, using the Tonkin Gulf resolution of 1964 to give the 
appearance of legislative endorsement for all military action.
When setting up inquiries, governments typically want to maximize credibility while 
minimizing the risk of damaging disclosures and adverse fi ndings. Internal inquiries 
and closed hearings are more likely to follow the offi  cial line and reduce bad publicity, 
but they have less credibility than open hearings by independent panels. Th erefore, it 
often happens that the government’s initial response to concern about an issue is to 
establish a closed internal inquiry and only move to open independent investigations if 
the pressure becomes too great. Th e offi  cial responses to revelations about the My Lai 
massacre followed this pattern.
Th e initial investigation of My Lai was conducted within the army by Colonel Hen-
derson and underestimated the numbers killed. After Lieutenant Ridenhour’s public 
revelation of what had occurred at My Lai, a further investigation, by the army’s Cri-
minal Investigation Division, was made. As a result of this investigation, a single sol-
dier, Lieutenant William Calley, was convicted of the murder of Vietnamese civilians. 
(Eleven others were prosecuted and none convicted. Calley, originally sentenced to life 
imprisonment, served only a limited time in prison (Belknap, 2002; Goldstein, Marshall 
and Schwartz, 1976: x-xi).) Th e army made few details public,
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releasing an “inaccurate and misleading statement” that gave no idea of the number of 
people massacred (Hersh, 1972: 4). 
Even so, public anger at what little was then known was so strong the Pentagon held 
meetings to consider tactics. Th e Army command decided it was necessary to hold a 
further, more public, investigation, charged with discovering why the previous investi-
gations had not revealed the details of what had happened. Th is investigation into the 
earlier investigations was popularly known as the Peers Panel after General William R. 
Peers, its director (Peers, 1979).
Following the appointment of the Peers Panel, public demand from both conservatives 
and liberals for an independent inquiry continued and increased. Seymour Hersh, the 
journalist responsible for exposing the details of the My Lai massacre, commented that 
his source had told him the army had become aware of this credibility problem and 
had responded by appointing “two prominent New York attorneys” to help allay public 
unease (Hersh, 1972: 232).
Calls for further independent investigation continued. Congressmen and court judges 
joined these demands. In response, Chairman Rivers of the Armed Services Committee 
ordered an investigation by his subcommittee. However even this was a closed hearing, 
with its report only released in partial form eight months later (Hersh, 1972: 233).
Th e public outcry against the “secret” U.S. operations in other parts of Indochina also 
led to Congressional inquiries. Th e hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommit-
tee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad in 1969 on U.S. incursions 
into Laos was held behind closed doors and the release of its fi ndings was opposed by 
the White House. Th e following year, only part of the investigation was made public 
(Gettleman et al., 1995: 446-47). 
Th e Peers Panel investigation into the My Lai massacre, beginning in 1969, was com-
prehensive, with 401 witnesses and tens of thousands of pages of testimony (Goldstein 
et al., 1976; Peers, 1979). Th e Panel concluded that charges should be laid against 15 
members of the armed services. However, initially the Panel would not allow the public 
to see this material, claiming that it would provide potentially damaging pretrial publi-
city for those involved and that material potentially damaging to U.S. foreign policy 
was not to be released (Goldstein et al., 1976: 6). Th e fi nal (censored) report was only 
released after concerted public pressure. In 1971 a section of the report and the volu-
mes of testimony and other material were made available to journalist Seymour Hersh, 
although these left out essential chapters on the actions of the responsible task force 
(Barker), the cover-up, and the conclusions and recommendations of the investigation 
(Hersh, 1972: 247).
8. Intimidation and Bribery 
People may feel concern, disgust, or revulsion about certain events but, as a result 
of threats, attacks, opportunities, or the promise of safety, decide not to act on their 
feelings. Intimidation and bribery are powerful tools to prevent backfi re from injusti-
ce, especially in war, when the use of force becomes normalized. In war, the targets of 
intimidation and bribery can be the enemy, third parties (such as journalists, foreign 
governments, or the domestic population), and core executors of the war, including 
dissident soldiers and policy makers. But there is a risk in using intimidation and bri-
bery, as these techniques, if exposed, can themselves cause outrage
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and generate greater backfi re. Th erefore these techniques are commonly used in con-
junction with cover-up. Th ere are numerous examples in the Indochina war, of which 
we select just a few.
Bombing, assassination, destruction of villages, and removal to camps are potent 
methods of intimidation, all used against the Indochinese in the long brutal war. Th e 
Pacifi cation Program, the bombing, and the Phoenix Program were all intended, as 
stated policy, to intimidate surviving villagers in order to weaken their support for the 
resistance (Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, 1970: 100-1).
U.S. military actions in Indochina were also intended to intimidate people in other 
countries, both in the region and around the world, who were organizing to follow 
a similar path of rural revolution. As researchers have pointed out, the contention by 
policy makers, such as Secretary of State Dean Rusk, was to “crush this ‘people’s war’ 
in order to prevent others in the future” (Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, 
1970: 101). While this intention may have been apparent to the people of Indochina, 
it was less clear to U.S. citizens.
Th e application by the U.S. forces in Vietnam of “massive mechanical and conventional 
power” was an overwhelming physical attack on the country. But in what has been des-
cribed as a “dual war,” the country was also subject to psychological warfare on a scale 
not equaled in history. Every variety of communication was employed in this aspect 
of the war including posters, newspapers, cartoon books, television and radio broad-
casts, and loudspeakers from planes. Over a period of seven years, the United States 
Information Agency, in conjunction with the U.S. armed forces, airdropped across the 
countryside in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia “nearly 50 billion leafl ets — more than 
1,500 for every person” in Vietnam” (Chandler, 1981: 3).
Th is eff ort could be seen as part of the method of reinterpretation, but it also played 
a key role in intimidation, given that these communications were designed, in large 
part, to promote fear. For example, leafl ets dropped on villages, before and after they 
were bombed, exhorted the villagers to get out and come over to “our side” before 
being destroyed. Former intelligence offi  cer Robert Chandler, in his study of these 
massive propaganda campaigns, reported that the “fear appeal was used to convince 
the individual soldier or civilian” with a message along the lines of, “Th ere are just two 
choices — more of this hell which can only end in death for you” or joining the U.S.-
supported side. Chandler reported that, “brutally macabre leafl ets … were used to scare 
Communist troops into giving up. … Death themes were repeated over and over in 
virtually all enemy-oriented communications” (Chandler, 1981: 44, 48).
Bribery is an alternative, and often a supplement, to intimidation. Th e U.S. gover-
nment established specifi c programs of bribery in Vietnam, for example the “Chieu 
Hoi” program, which off ered the Vietnamese sums of money to defect (or “rally”) to 
the U.S.-supported side in the war.
Bribery can work both by promising something and by making people fear the loss of 
something. For example, Seymour Hersh reported that for most U.S.-supported “Viet-
namese military offi  cers … careers and promotions depended to some degree on how 
well they got along with their [U.S.] counterparts … Many offi  cers apparently decided 
to solve the problem by hiding their feelings — and disturbing information — from 
their counterparts” (Hersh, 1970: 189).
21© Instituto de la paz y los conflictos 2008













   






Th is threatened loss of valued position and fi nancial security is evident throughout the 
armed forces of the United States as well. Lieutenant William Calley is reported to have 
said that when the company was being briefed to go into My Lai, his commanding 
offi  cer Medina had said “‘Our job … is to go in rapidly and to neutralize everything. 
To kill everything.’ ‘Captain Medina? Do you mean women and children, too?’ ‘I mean 
everything.’ Now, I know Medina denies this, and I know why. He’s married. He has 
children, and their benefi ts end if Medina is sentenced for it.” (Sack, 1971: 89-90; see 
also Belknap, 2002: 88-89).
An illustration of the more direct use of bribery was in the workings of the notorious 
“body count.” Th e Pentagon would claim victory if the number of “enemy” killed was 
greater than the number of “our” troops lost. To help achieve the desired kill ratio it 
has been reported that the soldiers who killed the greatest number of Viet Cong during 
a designated time period would be given a reward of either cash or the opportunity to 
take a Rest & Recreation vacation (Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, 1970: 
129-30).
Th e mass media often follow the agenda set by government, in part because government 
policies and pronouncements are considered inherently newsworthy according to the 
news values governing decisions by journalists and editors. In the main, the reporting of 
the war that was published or broadcast was largely uncritical reproduction of the offi  -
cial military line (Herman and Chomsky, 1994: 169-296). Although many journalists 
made accurate reports, these would often be changed by publishers, a process referred 
to by journalist David Halberstam as “the hamburger machine” (Anderson, 1998: 66). 
Journalists were also constrained by the possible loss of their jobs or of loss of access to 
offi  cial sources of information if they reported on the secret wars the U.S. military was 
carrying out against the peoples of Indochina particularly in Laos and Cambodia. 
To the daily internal processes encouraging conformity can be added the intimidation 
of journalists. For example, three journalists — writing for the New York Times, Life, 
and Agence France Presse —were able to make their way into Laos during the U.S. 
bombardment. When their presence was detected, they were arrested, interrogated, 
and, at the direction of the U.S. embassy, forcibly placed on a plane out of the country 
(Burchett, 1970: 181). 
Public opposition in the United States to the Vietnam War built up throughout the early 
sixties. In the following years this opposition rose to a groundswell. Many large public 
rallies across the United States were met with riot police and water cannon. Protesters 
were arrested and draft resisters were jailed. In some instances, police opened fi re on 
protesters at university campuses, most prominently at Kent State University where 
four students were killed. 
Prominent intellectuals and professionals were punished for their support of the antiwar 
movement, such as Dr. Benjamin Spock, Marcus Raskin, Michael Ferber, Mitchell 
Goodman, and the chaplain of Yale University, William Sloane Coffi  n, Jr., who in 1968 
were indicted for conspiracy to aid and abet draft resistance.
Inside the military, intimidation is routinely used to deter any form of resistance or 
rebellion: abuse, punishments, and court martial are typical tools. As the Vietnam war 
proceeded, resistance within the U.S. military increased, sometimes reaching such as 
scale that normal methods of social control were abandoned, because a
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crackdown might incite even greater resistance (Cortright, 1975; Moser, 1996). 
Meanwhile, within the higher levels of the U.S. military and policy-making apparatus, 
strong pressures existed to prevent expression of dissent, with the main penalty being 
exclusion from the inner circles of decision making, and lack of promotion (Buzzanco, 
1996; Halberstam, 1972).
9. Conclusion
Th e foundation of the backfi re model is the idea that an action has the potential to bac-
kfi re if two basic conditions are satisfi ed: it is seen as unjust, inappropriate, or excessive; 
and information about it is communicated to receptive audiences. According to this 
framework — and contrary to popular belief — the possession of overwhelming force 
does not guarantee victory, because using it can generate increased opposition. In the 
Indochina war, many of the actions of the U.S.-supported forces resulted in greater 
opposition, from the Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians, from U.S. citizens, from 
U.S. soldiers, and from people in other countries. Without this process, the overwhel-
ming U.S. military superiority would have prevailed.
Backfi re is not an automatic process. In war, the use of violence becomes normalized: it 
seems legitimate to use violence because the enemy is using it too. Th erefore, only some 
violent and gruesome actions in war cause outrage, such as the intentional killing of 
civilians. Th e backfi re model gives fi ve main methods, used by perpetrators, that inhibit 
outrage: cover-up, devaluation of the target, reinterpretation, use of offi  cial channels 
to give the appearance of justice, and intimidation and bribery. We have noted many 
examples of each of these methods used by the U.S. government and military in the 
Vietnam war. It would be easy to provide many more examples. 
Th e signifi cance of the fi ve methods is also shown by the lack of counterexamples. 
Th ere are many examples of cover-up, but very few examples in which U.S. soldiers 
killed civilians and freely off ered pictures to journalists. Th ere are many examples of 
devaluation of the enemy but few cases in which U.S. leaders praised the Viet Cong 
for their patriotism, commitment, and valor. Similarly, there are few examples in which 
the U.S. government offi  cials interpreted the war using non-self-serving perspectives or 
used offi  cial channels to indict senior policy makers and military commanders. 
Th e primary methods used for outrage-containment depend on the type of injustice 
involved as well as the circumstances. For example, cover-up on its own is suffi  cient 
to minimize outrage in many cases, so other methods are not needed; if cover-up fails, 
though, the other methods are brought into play. Offi  cial channels sometimes are used 
only after devaluation and reinterpretation have been tried and found inadequate. In 
some types of injustices, such as abusive treatment of refugees, devaluation is a key 
technique. In others, such as torture, cover-up is central. But there are exceptions to 
such patterns. For example, the idea of torture is so off ensive to some people that there 
can be no justifi cation for it. For others, though, torture of a nonviolent dissident is 
reprehensible but torture of a terrorist is not, in which case devaluation by labeling and 
false allegations becomes a more likely tactic. Until
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comparative studies are carried out, it is not possible to be defi nite about when diff erent 
methods are most likely to succeed.
Each of the fi ve methods of inhibiting outrage can be challenged. Th e obvious counter 
to cover-up is exposure, for example documenting atrocities and communicating the 
information to receptive audiences. In terms of the U.S. population as an audience, 
contributors to this process included military and civilian whistleblowers, investigative 
journalists, courageous editors, and tenacious members of Congress. Similarly, there 
were many who helped document and communicate information within Vietnamese 
communities, to international audiences, and within the U.S. military forces. Exposure 
is most important when few people know about an injustice. When exposure becomes 
widespread, perpetrators often turn to other methods.
To counter devaluation, it is vital to humanize the targets of injustices. It is far easier 
to justify assault on a faceless enemy than a fl esh-and-blood person with feelings and 
family ties. Given the language barrier, cultural diff erences, and the physical distance of 
Indochina from the United States, photography provided a powerful tool to challenge 
devaluation. Th e famous photograph of a Vietnamese girl fl eeing a napalm raid both 
exposed an injustice and portrayed a human face.
To counter reinterpretation, it is important to repeatedly emphasize the unacceptability 
of bombing, assassination, and massacres. It is vital to present carefully researched analy-
ses of the war and its eff ects and to challenge spurious explanations. It is also important 
to assign responsibility when blame is offl  oaded, such as when senior offi  cials blame a 
few rogue soldiers for atrocities. Th e struggle over interpretations continued throug-
hout the Indochina war, with government statements, intellectual justifi cations, and 
disinformation countered by critical articles, talks, and teach-ins. Indeed, the struggle 
over interpretation of the Indochina war continues today.
Sometimes an exposure is so vivid and compelling that it cuts through devaluation and 
reinterpretation as well as cover-up. Some photos, such as those taken at My Lai, can 
humanize the target, countering devaluation, and allow the viewer to judge the situation 
directly, countering the explanations given by perpetrators.
Th ere are two main ways to counter offi  cial channels: to discredit them or to ignore 
them and proceed with other means such as publicity and campaigning. Th e biggest 
challenge in countering offi  cial channels is to deal with their continuing appeal despite 
the predictability that their use will defuse outrage. For example, for years, peace nego-
tiations off ered the promise of an end to the war, but, as it has been revealed, the antiwar 
movement would have been unwise to rely on these negotiations. Th e key message is 
that continued campaigning is needed even when it seems like offi  cial processes are 
dealing with a problem. 
Finally, intimidation and bribery can be opposed by refusing to be intimidated or bribed 
and by exposing these methods. Th is is easier said than done: only some people are in 
a situation where they can take the risk of standing up to intimidation. Resistance is 
much easier when many are involved. Th e more people who speak out, the easier it is 
for yet others to do so.
Our aim in this paper has been to show how a diverse range of methods used in war 
— including censorship, propaganda, offi  cial inquiries, and the use or non-use of
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force — can be understood as related processes within a single framework. Injustices 
can potentially backfi re on those who are perceived as perpetrators: the elaboration of 
this simple dynamic helps to explain the tactics used by supporters of war and can give 
guidance to opponents. 
In analyzing techniques for containing public outrage, we have not tried to make a 
judgment of their success. In other words, we have not tried to assess whether or to 
what extent bombing, assassination, and the My Lai massacre actually backfi red on 
the U.S. government. Th ere are many contingencies aff ecting the scale of backfi re, 
including the media environment and public receptivity (which is aff ected by antiwar 
campaigning). 
As in warfare itself, choice of a suitable tactic can improve the odds of success, but 
within limits imposed by resources, circumstances and counter-tactics. To evaluate the 
strength of tactics, it would be necessary to establish measures of success and collect 
data to test whether specifi c tactics are linked to these measures, a major research project 
well outside the scope of this paper. 
It is quite typical for one atrocity to pass virtually unnoticed and another — such as 
My Lai — to cause tremendous abhorrence. Instead of trying to analyze the scale of 
backfi re, we have focused on revealing the common techniques used in struggles over 
actions perceived as unjust in wartime. Understanding these techniques can off er insight 
to those who oppose injustice.
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